'You try to be a fair employer': Regulation and employment relationships in medium-sized firms by Atkinson, Carol et al.
International Small Business Journal
 1 –18
© The Author(s) 2014
Reprints and permissions: 
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0266242614541992
isb.sagepub.com
Small Firmsisbj
‘You try to be a fair employer’: 
Regulation and employment 
relationships in medium-sized  
firms
Carol Atkinson
Manchester Metropolitan University (MMU) Business School, UK
Oliver Mallett
Durham University Business School, UK 
Robert Wapshott
Sheffield University Management School, UK
Abstract
In this article, we explore the dynamic, indirect effects of employment regulation through a 
qualitative study of three medium-sized enterprises and their ongoing, everyday employment 
relationships. Whereas owner–manager prerogative is generally associated with informality in small 
and medium-sized enterprises, we identify instances of formal policies and procedures implemented 
in response to regulation being instrumental in exerting this prerogative. Furthermore, employees 
reinforced this process by making judgements regarding the employment relationship in terms of 
their perceived informal psychological contract rather than external regulatory obligations. This 
article extends understanding of dynamic, indirect regulatory effects in relation to the interplay of 
informality and formality within psychological contracts in medium-sized enterprises.
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Introduction
Business regulation represents an attempt by governments and other bodies to influence or con-
trol organisational practices, for example, in maintaining open markets but also in areas such as 
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protecting employee rights. Such attempts have received particular attention in relation to small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Kitching, 2006; Westrip, 1986) associated with the dom-
inant political narrative of enterprise and business growth (Perren and Jennings, 2005). In this 
context, regulation is frequently considered as over-complicated, unnecessary and burdensome, 
with these problems falling disproportionately upon SMEs (Edwards et al., 2004; Young, 2012). 
However, the effects of regulation on such firms, which can take dynamic and indirect forms, 
merits further critical consideration (Kitching et al., 2013a, 2013b). Thus, our critical underpin-
ning research question critically analyses: ‘how does regulation influence medium-sized firms in 
dynamic and indirect ways?’ with a particular focus on employment regulation.
In addition to the operating contexts and competing external influences upon firms such as 
market forces, the effects of regulation should be understood in terms of what is happening inside 
the firm since neither owner–managers nor their employees are passive recipients of such influ-
ences (Marlow et al., 2005; Ram, 1994). To explore this internal negotiation and adaptation, we 
present empirical material from qualitative, semi-structured research interviews across three 
medium-sized enterprises. Our findings illustrate that compliance with regulation does not neces-
sarily constrain the exercise of informal management prerogative, but rather alters how it is exer-
cised. Furthermore, employees apply a broad sense of the psychological contract to evaluate the 
employment relationship and management in their firms, only rarely referring to specific external 
regulatory provisions. The interpretive insights that emerge from these findings aid the conceptual 
development of the psychological contract in the specific context of medium-sized enterprises in 
terms of the interplay between formal and informal elements of the employment relationship. It is 
through this development of the psychological contract that we advance an understanding of the 
dynamic, indirect effects of regulation within these firms.
To critically explore our research question, this article is structured as follows: the literature 
analysis locates our work in the debates surrounding the regulatory context of SMEs and the psy-
chological contract as a valuable approach to understanding employment relationships in these 
firms. The ‘methodology and method’ section describes how the empirical materials were gener-
ated and analysed, followed by a presentation of the key findings on a firm-by-firm basis. Our 
discussion develops insights into dynamic, indirect regulatory effects in relation to the interplay of 
informality and formality within psychological contracts in medium-sized enterprises. The article 
concludes by outlining the implications and limitations of our work along with opportunities for 
further research.
Literature analysis
Firms relate, by degrees, to a regulatory context that, as well as supporting the markets in which 
they operate (Kitching et al., 2013a), can reduce or constrain owner–manager prerogative and 
influence employment relationships, for example, through a minimum-wage or working-time reg-
ulations (Arrowsmith et al., 2003; Marlow, 2003). However, in the neo-liberal discourse of eco-
nomic growth, within which a prominent place is given to SMEs, regulation has been framed as 
inhibiting their ability to operate and is considered a burden (Kitching, 2013b). In response, gov-
ernments such as that of the United Kingdom, seek ‘to reduce the number of unnecessary regula-
tions that hold back businesses while ensuring that both workers and the public are protected’ 
(Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), 2013). However, it is difficult to identify 
what effects regulations actually have or to link the mandates and prohibitions to particular busi-
ness outcomes (Edwards et al., 2004; Kitching, 2006). Instead, it is necessary to adopt a more 
nuanced, dynamic understanding of regulation and SMEs.
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Furthermore, there is a need to recognise the distinctive contexts of those organisations typi-
cally grouped under the ‘SME’ banner. Sectoral considerations aside (Arrowsmith et al., 2003), the 
challenges and responses one might encounter in a small business could differ from those found in 
medium-sized enterprises that may retain a degree of owner–manager control and informality 
(Mallett and Wapshott, 2014) while also possessing a greater degree of formality (Kotey and 
Sheridan, 2004). This coexistence of informality and formality provides interesting sites in which 
to explore how regulation is enacted through employment relationships (Marlow, 2003; Marlow et 
al., 2010). However, a focus on medium-sized firms also provides difficulties in relating to the 
existing literature where small and medium-sized enterprises are rarely treated as distinct. Despite 
this limitation, taking the field as we find it permits engagement with regulatory issues discussed 
in the literature, while our empirical material speaks specifically to the experiences of medium-
sized enterprises.
The regulatory context of SMEs
SMEs, broadly defined as those with up to 249 employees (Office for National Statistics (ONS)/
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2013), are context-sensitive and dominated inter-
nally by the interests and goals of owner–managers (Marlow, 2005). Even as such firms adopt 
formal policies, often to accompany growth (Phelps et al., 2007), owner–managers frequently 
retain preferences for informal and individualised practices (Hoque and Noon, 2004; Mallett and 
Wapshott, 2014), which can contribute to a higher incidence of employment tribunal applications 
(Saridakis et al., 2008). Viewed as dominant influences within their firms, owner–managers are, 
therefore, often the target of regulatory interventions, debates and research projects.
Commonly cited objections to regulations include compliance costs associated with under-
standing and adapting to new rules and obligations (Smallbone and Welter, 2001) and affinity costs 
where regulatory compliance requires accompanying changes (Edwards et al., 2004), often without 
the necessary resources or expertise of in-house human resource (HR) professionals (Harris, 2002; 
Hart and Blackburn, 2005). Furthermore, owner–managers generally express a dislike for any 
measures that interfere with their managerial prerogative (Atkinson and Curtis, 2004; Westrip, 
1986). Accordingly, firms may avoid growth through outsourcing to circumnavigate the regulatory 
obligations and scrutiny associated with the employment relationship (Bischoff and Wood, 2013; 
Perraudin et al., 2013).
Studies into the effects of regulation on SMEs, however, suggest that its role in day-to-day 
operations may be overstated and more nuanced than business lobby groups suggest (Carter et al., 
2009; Edwards et al., 2004; Westrip, 1986). Owner–manager understanding is often vague on the 
details of employment regulations (Hart and Blackburn, 2005; Marlow, 2003) and, while they 
express general dissatisfaction with regulatory conditions, relatively few report being affected by 
specific provisions (Atkinson and Curtis, 2004; Carter et al., 2009). This may derive, in part, from 
the dominant socio-historical discourses around the burdens of regulation but also those that con-
struct SMEs as unlikely to comply with these regulations.
In practice, the situation may be more complicated than is often presented. Kitching et al. 
(2013a) argue that ‘there is no typical “small business effect” of regulation; outcomes vary over 
time, contingent on the agency of small businesses and their stakeholders’ (p.7). Particular regula-
tions, and how they are interpreted, will affect businesses in different ways owing to differences in 
firm size, age and sector (Arrowsmith et al., 2003; Hart and Blackburn, 2005; Morris et al., 2005) 
as well as to competitive conditions, degrees of regulatory enforcement and the responses of others 
in the firm’s external and internal environments (Harris, 2000; Kitching, 2006). This creates a 
range of particular understandings of how given sets of regulations may apply to an organisation 
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with owner–manager understanding often negotiated, drawing on a variety of sources such as 
external advisors, customers and employees (Kitching, 2006). Not all regulatory effects will be 
perceived or understood by owner–managers who are, for example, less likely to acknowledge any 
enabling effects (Kitching et al., 2013b).
Furthermore, we should not overlook the importance of employees in influencing how regula-
tions may impact upon organisational practice. For example, highly skilled workers might exert 
additional, informal pressure on their employers to secure their rights and interests (Bacon and 
Hoque, 2005; Wapshott and Mallett, 2013). However, even the highly skilled may have little 
awareness of their legal rights (Bacon and Hoque, 2005) so, while regulatory non-compliance by 
owner–managers can negatively impact employee views of the employment relationship (National 
Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux (NACAB), 2000), it does not necessarily lead to explicit 
action to enforce employment rights (Ram et al., 2007). To encompass these internal forces and the 
potential for negotiation, this article will focus predominantly on employment regulation.
Taking a process perspective, the effects of employment regulation are influenced by a range of 
factors including ‘the nature of different laws, the mediating effect of competitive conditions, and 
the context of relationships inside small firms’ (Edwards et al., 2004: 247). Discussing the generic 
effect of regulation is too crude; such effects are dynamic, positive and negative, direct and indirect 
(Kitching et al., 2013a) and businesses of similar size cannot be assumed to be homogeneous 
(Burrows and Curran, 1989; Marlow et al., 2005). Furthermore, regulatory effects need to be 
understood in terms of not only formal contracts and policies but also the day-to-day informal 
employment relationship and individual perceptions of the psychological contract.
The psychological contract in SMEs
The close physical proximity and interpersonal contact that breed high degrees of informality in 
SMEs (Bacon and Hoque, 2005; Ram and Edwards, 2003) involve improvised ad hoc solutions 
and compromises, producing or adopting formal policies and procedures but also unwritten prac-
tices, routines and tacit understandings (Brown et al., 2010; Ram et al., 2001). Even as firms grow 
and attempt to formalise (Phelps et al., 2007), degrees of informality remain an important part of 
everyday employment relationships (Mallett and Wapshott, 2014). Different degrees of (in)formal-
ity may be deployed in response to particular internal and external demands and, instead of a com-
peting duality, informality and formality can be considered as coexistent (Marlow et al., 2010).
This close proximity and coexistence of informality and formality produces interpersonal forms 
of negotiation and interaction where it is clear who the employer is and where differences in the 
application of policy or practice are more likely to be felt at an individual level (Ram, 1994). This 
employment relationship is interpreted like a contract albeit, given its intersubjective nature 
(Wapshott and Mallett, 2013), one liable to misinterpretation and breach (Guest, 1998) and likely 
to escape conceptualisations of traditional, formal contracts. The interplay between informality 
and formality that informs the negotiation and maintenance of these employment relationships in 
SMEs can be best considered in terms of a psychological contract (Atkinson, 2008; Nadin and 
Cassell, 2007).
Psychological contracts consist of the perceptions of both parties to the employment relation-
ship and the reciprocal obligations implied within it (Guest and Conway, 2002). Such contracts 
are considered transactional and relational (Rousseau, 1990), where the former reflect obligations 
around pay and advancement and the latter, areas such as job security and development. Relational 
breaches are likely to have deeper impacts than transactional breaches, although these differences 
are not always clear and are dependent upon context (Atkinson, 2007; Guest, 1998). SMEs repre-
sent such a context where psychological contracts may differ from the larger firms featured in 
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most studies, for example, owing to the distinct mix of close social and spatial proximity, resource 
constraints and degrees of informality and formality (Atkinson, 2008; Nadin and Cassell, 2007). 
However, there have been very few studies of psychological contracts in small and, especially, 
medium-sized enterprises, and the implications of the concept are underdeveloped in these 
contexts.
There are difficulties in drawing out meaningful generalisations about SMEs given the context-
dependent nature of the contract and the variety of employment practices adopted (Cassell et al., 
2002). Furthermore, some studies have focused exclusively on one party to the employment rela-
tionship, such as Nadin and Cassell’s (2007) study of small firm owner–managers, which high-
lighted their unwillingness to make obligations explicit. There is also a risk in applying the 
psychological contract as a conceptual framework since, as Dick and Nadin (2011) found, it can 
lack relevance for some participants, specifically those in small firms with low-status, low-paid 
jobs. Partly as a result, the degree to which these perceived rights and obligations represent a con-
tract is disputed in as much as it is not freely entered into, negotiated or agreed upon (Cullinane and 
Dundon, 2006).
This however, misrepresents how formal employment contracts operate in practice (Cullinane 
and Dundon, 2006; Guest, 1998) where they are infused with an informality that is largely unrec-
ognised. This can take the form of (mis)interpretations, implied terms around fair treatment or in 
relation to common law rules based around sectoral norms (Middlemiss, 2011). This may be espe-
cially important with low-status employees in relatively informal, non-unionised SMEs lacking 
awareness of their rights (Arrowsmith et al., 2003), where understanding may be derived directly 
from employers, second-hand interpretations and broader socio-historical discourses, such as those 
around health and safety or part-time working (Barrett et al., 2014; Cullinane and Dundon, 2006; 
Middlemiss, 2011). As a result, managers and employees can come to fill in the gaps they perceive 
in the ambiguities of policies and HR guidance (Dick, 2010), constructing more specific obliga-
tions and expectations.
While recognising the psychological contract as a discursive product derived, in part, from 
broader neo-liberal discourses (Cullinane and Dundon, 2006), it can, nonetheless, help counterbal-
ance a purely legalistic, formal view of the employment relationship, embracing the importance of 
subjectivity and indeterminacy (Cullinane and Dundon, 2006). The sense of contractual obligation 
usefully conceptualises the experiences and expectations of employees, especially in the more 
informal working environment of SMEs (Atkinson, 2008; Dundon and Wilkinson, 2009). While 
such perceived rights and obligations are rarely explicit and may, or may not, be shared (Arnold, 
1996), failure to fulfil an obligation still has potentially negative consequences for the employment 
relationship (Robinson and Morrison, 2000). Accordingly, when conceptualising the dynamic, 
indirect effects of employment regulation within SMEs, it is important to consider how it may 
affect psychological contracts in terms of the perceived rights and obligations of both employees 
and employers.
Methodology and method
This project began with the research question: how does regulation influence medium-sized firms 
in dynamic and indirect ways? The chosen focus to explore this question is the internal understand-
ing and negotiation of employment regulation in ongoing, everyday employment relationships. To 
this end, we studied three quite different medium-sized enterprises via an in-depth, qualitative 
multiple-case study approach (Yin, 2003). The focus on medium-sized enterprises arose from an 
interest in the negotiation and interpretation of regulation in firms retaining a degree of informality 
and owner–manager control while also having formalised and introduced a range of employment 
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policies and practices (Kotey and Sheridan, 2004; Marlow et al., 2010). These firms also provided 
opportunities to talk to multiple employees who may interpret or experience regulations and their 
rights and obligations differently.
The three firms explored in this study were selected via purposive sampling to identify owner–
managed businesses with between 50 and 100 employees. Using a university’s business contact 
list, access was negotiated by telephone to three firms in the North of England. The firms shared a 
relatively high degree of formalisation in terms of the existence of policies and procedures and 
their espoused approach to regulatory compliance. Each firm was headed by owner–managers, 
emphasising the notion of personalised management, and were small in comparison to their per-
ceived competitors, competing in markets where large firms dominated.
The firms were drawn from the financial services, manufacturing and information technology 
sectors. Consistent with the exploratory nature of this study, this range of sectors was adopted to 
offer scope for variety in the everyday nature of the employment relationships, with employees 
possessing different levels of status, education and skills (Bacon and Hoque, 2005). This approach 
was in line with our aims not to generalise to a specific population but, instead, to examine the 
ongoing, everyday processes and dynamics within each case, supported by some comparisons 
between sectors to generate additional insights (Ram et al., 2001).
Given some of the sensitive material discussed, all three firms and each participant have been 
given pseudonyms. Due to potential commercial sensitivity, gaining access to each firm required 
assurances that anonymity would be protected and only general, non-specific data would be 
published.
Generating empirical materials
Qualitative studies are well-suited to the complexity and messiness of regulatory effects but under-
used in relation to SMEs and, more broadly, in terms of exploring the psychological contract or with 
low-status employees (Dick and Nadin, 2011; Kitching et al., 2013a). Furthermore, heeding Kitching’s 
(2006) warnings against focusing narrowly on the employer perspective upon regulation as cost or 
constraint, our approach incorporated employer and employee viewpoints to help understand the 
range of responses and to explore the different interpretations of the psychological contract.
To explore how understandings of employment regulation were negotiated within the employ-
ment relationship, empirical materials were generated from documents and semi-structured inter-
views. The documents were primarily in the form of employee handbooks and policy documents 
where the firms typically set out their formal interpretation of regulation and the employment 
relationship. Between 12 and 15 semi-structured interviews were conducted in each firm, giving a 
total of 41 interviews. The interviews were held with owner–managers, managers and employees, 
lasting between 30 and 60 minutes. The interviews were recorded and then transcribed verbatim to 
facilitate subsequent analysis.
The research participants were drawn from a range of departments and hierarchical levels to 
capture a variety of experience. However, through necessity, access to participants was negotiated 
with owner–-managers and participants. In general, the participants in all three firms appeared will-
ing to be part of the research process and most welcomed the opportunity to air their views. Their 
responses appeared to be frank, expressing a range of opinions and experiences. We will briefly 
describe the participants for each firm in the relevant subsections of the ‘Findings’ section.
Each interview started with a general discussion of working lives before focusing in greater 
detail on the understandings of regulation and the role it played in shaping organisational practices 
and psychological contracts. This approach sought to explore the general perceptions of respond-
ents regarding their everyday experiences in relation to a broad regulatory context, with a 
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particular focus on employment regulation. To help elicit more detail, respondents were also asked 
to describe critical incidents (Herriot et al., 1997) where they or others had engaged with regulation 
to their benefit or detriment. Not all respondents were able to cite a critical incident but those 
accounts that were discussed provided a powerful means of generating insight (Purvis and Cropley, 
2003) and, in many cases, critical incidences also emerged in more general discussions around 
each participant’s working life. These incidents were discussed in terms of what happened, why it 
happened, how it was handled and the consequences (Cope and Watts, 2000).
Analysis
Using NVivo software, sections of transcribed interviews and materials such as the employee 
handbook were organised by coding examples in which regulation was cited in relation to particu-
lar aspects of employment relationships, for instance, prompting or constraining particular actions 
as well as instances of perceived expectations, rights or obligations. We did not create a formal 
coding dictionary owing to the inductive nature of the coding process. Instead, consistency of 
interpretation was achieved by resolving any disagreements by revisiting and discussing the empir-
ical source materials until consensus was reached.
When the coding was completed, the empirical material was organised in relation to a broad 
range of codes covering different aspects of regulation and the perceived rights and obligations of 
employees and employers. The codes and relevant extracts of empirical materials were analysed in 
light of the extant literature on employment relationships, the psychological contract and regula-
tion in SMEs. As we worked through our analysis, we identified several key themes that repre-
sented our understanding of the dynamic, indirect effects of regulation within the participant firms 
and helped to generate interpretive insights. In the next section, we present some of the key themes 
within the context of each individual firm.
Findings
This section will focus upon each business in turn to maintain the context of the particular sector 
and firm-specific details. Owing to constraints of space we cannot provide exhaustive details of 
each relevant instance without losing the detail and nuance facilitated by our qualitative approach, 
but we have attempted to present those most representative of the emergent themes. The three 
firms are discussed with a focus on the mix of formality and informality in the different contexts 
of each firm. Taking each firm in turn, we focus on the following: formal documentation, specifi-
cally the employee handbook; a mix of formality and informality around day-to-day relations and 
health and safety compliance; and the changing role of formality in redundancy processes and 
their aftermath.
Before discussing each firm, it is worth noting that, reflecting their relatively high degrees of 
formalisation, management in all three firms had relationships with external specialists who helped 
them ensure at least minimal compliance with regulation. As such, the specialists were additional 
partners to the employment relationship. In contrast, none of the employee participants were union 
members or had recognised specialists of their own to consult or direct contact with the advisers.
InsCo
InsCo is an insurance broker, operating in a heavily regulated, fiercely competitive market but 
experiencing high profitability and strong year-on-year financial growth. The current Chief 
Executive is the son of the founder, providing a consistent management style and exhibiting 
 at Manchester Metropolitan (Y) on January 7, 2015isb.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
8 International Small Business Journal 
apparently harmonious employment relations. Interviews were conducted with 14 from around 95 
employees. Interviews were held with the Chief Executive (owner–manager: Fred), the Managing 
Director, one senior and one middle manager, a supervisor and nine other employees from a range 
of insurance product teams.
Fred and his employees presented themselves as striving to deliver and receive good treat-
ment, fulfilling a broad range of transactional and relational obligations in the employment 
relationship. Perhaps supported by the firm’s strong financial performance, many employees 
talked in positive terms about training delivery, bonuses, approach to time off and often used 
paternalistic phrases such as that the firm ‘looked after’ its employees. Participants sometimes 
had difficulty in providing incidents for discussion in terms of breach of obligations.
Several employees described examples of positive experiences. For instance, Peter, who had 
been with the firm for some time, used relational terms:
I can only relate to when my parents died. Apart from just the general time off for dependants, they were 
very kind and very caring they came to me and said if you need extra time, don’t worry.
Fred was broadly aware of regulatory provisions, taking advice from solicitors as required and 
indicating that employees were always afforded their rights, although he had little detailed knowl-
edge of these. He suggested, however, that employment regulation was largely irrelevant as it was 
‘30 years behind good business practice’ and that he would strive to offer employees more than 
their minimum rights:
We certainly wouldn’t follow legislation if it didn’t suit us. And I say this in a positive way, if for whatever 
overwhelming reason we wanted to do something that legislation said no, we would weigh it up and 
probably do it anyway.
Employee understanding of regulation was largely derived from the staff handbook. For exam-
ple, Patricia, when asked about her understanding of employment regulations, replied,
When we join we’re given a staff handbook and it’s pages and pages and I didn’t read through it in much 
detail but looked through it generally and it’s got a copy of all the rights that we have and there’s also a 
copy of that on everyone’s computer.
However, staff suggested the knowledge of regulation that was derived from the handbook, or 
other sources, was limited. An administrator, Emily, explained,
I think it’s actually up to you to find out what your rights are. […] If I wanted to know about something, 
say maternity leave, I’d have to get the book out. I wouldn’t know it off by heart. […] I know what’s in the 
handbook, but not anything else.
David, the Group Administrator, illustrated how InsCo’s conception of the employment rela-
tionship engaged with the handbook:
… although the staff handbook does state, I’m not entirely sure, that salary will be paid for the X number 
of months, in the past, if anybody has been off which has exceeded whatever the arbitrary period is before 
salary drops, there has always been a decision taken and they are always retained on full pay. They do look 
after them exceptionally well.
However, David also described the potential weaknesses in management’s approach to 
compliance:
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They allow personal preference, personal liking to colour their decisions. In my view, it is probably true to 
say that that manner of dealing with things costs them money in terms of paying-people-out where, in fact, 
we could have been more professional in our decision making.
Owner–manager Fred expanded on this approach:
… we have a fantastic sentence which goes at the end of everything, which is in the staff handbook, 
everybody’s basic rights and legal rights are tried and at the end of it we have said this may be altered at 
the discretion of the directors. So, for example, the paternity leave, we just top it up to the full. […]. But 
I’m not going to write it down that that is what we are going to do because, well, somebody really tried to 
take the mickey out of us. We want the flexibility of awarding it as a bonus really, so that’s the flexibility.
While he could not think of a situation where he would withhold these rights, Fred’s aversion to 
formalising what was currently achieved via informal, relational arrangements was clear. Thus, at 
InsCo, formal documents such as the staff handbook filtered understanding of the regulatory con-
text as external consultants ensured it maintained minimal compliance. As with the other partici-
pating firms, the handbook was perceived by employees as representing their full rights and 
obligations in an equitable, open manner. However, for management, the handbook was seen as a 
starting point from which they would exercise their discretion to allow rights that they perceived 
as ‘over and above’ regulatory compliance.
SteelCo
SteelCo is a manufacturing firm operating in a regulatory context that highlighted health and safety, 
a topic that repeatedly emerged in interviews in contractual terms, alongside other transactional ele-
ments of perceived rights and obligations (see also Walker and Hutton, 2006). At SteelCo, 12 inter-
views were undertaken from a total of 65 employees. Interviews were held with the Managing 
Director (owner–manager Owen), the Divisional Director, the Works Manager, the Works Foreman, 
seven machine operatives and one sales person. The interviews typically lasted 30 to 60 minutes.
The firm had retained consistent ownership but, despite previously being profitable, at the time 
of the research it was barely breaking-even with stagnant growth and operating within tight mar-
gins. Owen believed he treated employees well, although he felt this was largely not reciprocated. 
He had some awareness, though little detailed knowledge, of employment regulation and resented 
the increased formality that procedures to ensure compliance required:
The old method, the old terminology we had was ‘smack ‘em and sack ‘em’ and it worked. You can’t any 
more.
Owen saw key incidents relating to employment regulation in terms of issues such as maternity pay 
that were generally negotiated directly with individual staff, excluding the firm’s legal advisers. 
We quote at length to try to capture Owen’s attitude and approach as well as an example of the role 
of informal negotiation:
The only girls we’ve got work in the offices and they’re all past their sell by date, so I don’t think the 
parental thing comes into it. I say that but the amount of times, we’ve just [opened a new office] and this 
girl that’s gone down there is going to be a nightmare as an employee because she’s been with us for two 
months, she’s already had a week or two weeks off sick, she didn’t come in yesterday or the day before 
because her daughter was unwell. You start to see a pattern, and think there’s going to be a problem. […] 
We had one incident when one of the reps one day said I’ve got to go to pick the kids up from school and 
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I said what about your wife and he replied that she was working, and I told him that so was he. I said to 
him, your wife works part-time doesn’t she? And he said yes, so I said whose job’s the breadwinner, 
whose is more important. He replied that she can’t, so I said what are you going to say if I say you can’t. 
You try to be a fair employer.
The relatively low-status employees expressed a clear view that they were afforded little respect by 
the owner–manager. However, dissatisfaction was not generally expressed in relation to issues such 
as child care, perhaps reflecting long tenures and a consistent management style. Focused on transac-
tional elements of the psychological contract, concerns instead related more to areas such as overtime 
availability and promotion procedures. Matthew, for example, explained,
… they said they were going to bring in the bonus scheme which they did. I trust that if they say something 
then they will do it. It might take a while but they do get around to it.
Owen’s resistance to regulation and his opposition to improved terms and conditions were rein-
forced by his experience of an employment tribunal. He appeared wary of employees and was 
concerned that he might face further claims, adjusting his behaviour in response to what he per-
ceived as a breach of relational obligations:
I mean there is one of the reps upstairs who’s worked with me for nearly 13 years … I always had this habit 
with this guy to smack him across the head, but it was a term of endearment honestly and it was just like 
‘get on with it’ in a joke. Apparently he got to the stage where he was going to use that against me and he 
knew without any question it was done in fun with him.
However, Cliff, a manager with long tenure, explained the value of greater formality in terms of 
relieving a pressure to worry about compliance and providing clarity for employees:
Where probably a few years ago, [Owen] would say sack him and then we’d end up at a tribunal saying 
we shouldn’t have sacked him, well now it’s all done by the book and they know that on the shop floor so 
they respond to discipline. If I’m going to discipline them then it’s for their own good.
The implementation of such policy, as at InsCo, was supported by documents such as handbooks 
and manuals. Employees signed to confirm they had read the new health and safety manual and 
thereby took personal responsibility, even though many reported not actually reading the 
manual.
This lack of engagement with formal policy was despite the dangerous nature of the work. 
Ralph, a machine operator, explained,
There was one guy who was actually killed in the works last year. […] he’d got a coil of steel, like a toilet 
roll, which slipped down, and the guy actually got in amongst them and he got crushed. That’s difficult, 
it’s health and safety. I mean obviously there has been no real blame proportioned to anybody, it was 
basically his own fault for being daft. […] That caused ructions.
Cliff explained some of the implications:
Apart from me and [colleague], no-one, not the Chairman or [Owen] sat and talked to them about it and 
people were low. That’s bad treatment from them. Because it was over the Christmas period, there was a 
gap, but me and [colleague] felt that we needed to talk to the staff, we made a point of taking them for a 
drink, having a chat, making sure they was alright. One of them said they was never coming back, but 
every one of them came back.
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The senior management in the firm appeared to view health and safety predominantly in terms 
of their insurance policy and health and safety documents. In contrast, employees, who frequently 
expressed apparently dangerous attitudes to their own safety, perceived such incidents as a serious 
breach of the employer’s obligation to maintain their safety, irrespective of the specific details of 
what caused the incident. They certainly did not see this obligation as fulfilled by a new policy or 
by signing the relevant documentation.
TechCo
TechCo is a software house which produces specialised software for an increasingly saturated 
niche market, and previously strong financial performance over many years had deteriorated. 
Fifteen interviews were carried out at TechCo, from a total of around 90 employees. Interviews 
were held with the owner–manager, a senior manager, three team leaders, eight technical employ-
ees and two administrative staff.
While the business generally broke even, in some years, it had made losses, leading to two 
major restructuring programmes and the company being bought out. The new owner, Mark, was 
more formal and procedure-focused than his predecessor. Increased formalisation was regretted 
and even resented by employees and it was described as at odds with the family style of the com-
pany. Many of the staff had a long tenure and there was a range of transactional and relational 
obligations perceived by both parties to the employment relationship. Several employees spoke of 
being supported during difficult periods outside of work although there were also concerns about 
a lack of investment in training and development.
Susan, an employee with a very long tenure, explained the company’s approach to time off in 
relation to degrees of informality within the apparently formal policies:
We do have formal policies but, again, at the end of the day, if somebody goes to their manager and their 
manager, and I’m not saying soft touch, that’s the wrong word, is more sympathetic, then they may be 
able to take half day flexi or time off in lieu whereas another manager will say no that contravenes the 
procedure.
Social relations at TechCo had been severely disrupted by two rounds of redundancies in 
the previous three years. Power asymmetries were clearly evident throughout these processes, 
despite a mainly graduate workforce theoretically holding some labour market power. This 
had contributed to an ‘us and them’ culture as well as low morale described by several 
employees.
Development Manager Henry, placing himself with the employees (‘us’), gave a representative 
outline of the employee perspective:
I think they completely cocked up the first round of redundancies, they treated us like commodities, rather 
than individuals […] it was completely impersonal […] they basically sent out an e-mail saying in two 
weeks’ time a group of you will be made redundant, and that was it.
The first, ‘cocked up’ redundancy exercise still survived as an eagerly told story within the organi-
sation, related in terms of an episode of a popular UK sitcom The Office where the fictional office’s 
manager announces redundancies in the context of his own promotion.
However, the owner–manager asserted that these exercises were legislatively compliant and 
some employees perceived the adoption of a scoring system as lending the second round some 
legitimacy. Nigel, a project manager said,
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Well, certainly the [second] redundancy process was done very fairly I think. The way people were 
objectively scored, it wasn’t just one person’s opinion. So, the exec gave quite a lot of credibility in the 
redundancy process even though it’s very stressful for everybody concerned, at least they had a dependable 
and fair process that they had gone through.
However, a number of other employees suggested that regulations had been used to support a sham 
selection procedure which justified the selection of those employees senior management already 
wanted to exit. Terry, a developer commented,
There was a set of criteria basically, so like what skills a person had, how flexible they were, how much 
this person bought into the company principles and so on. I believe they had already targeted who they 
wanted to get rid of and then manipulated the scores.
Owner–manager Mark explained how the redundancy selection process was used to address 
problems ignored by everyday practices in a business that had been reluctant to use disciplinary 
procedures to address perceived issues such as excessive sick leave. By adopting selection criteria 
that addressed these areas, staff perceived as problems were made redundant.
Many staff talked about the impact of redundancies on trust. Several mentioned how, after being 
told the first round would not be repeated, the second round was presented not in terms of financial 
necessity but rather as a phase of restructuring. Other employees gave detailed examples of spe-
cific cases they felt demonstrated either insincerity or incompetence in the selection procedure, 
such as a colleague who had been laid off due to high levels of sick leave following a miscarriage. 
It was suggested that the employer had a relational obligation to consider such circumstances 
alongside the more formal selection criteria. Therefore, even if minimally compliant with regula-
tion, this second exercise was seen by some as a breach of the relational psychological contract.
In the context of the redundancy exercise, there was very little acknowledgement from senior 
management of a relational psychological contract or any rights or obligations that might be asso-
ciated with it. Instead, they focused on minimal compliance and, given the financial struggles of 
the firm, ensuring the best outcome for firm performance.
Discussion
The effects of regulation can be dynamic and indirect (Kitching et al., 2013a) and so are complex 
and difficult to understand. This has important implications, not only for individual firms but for 
broader debates around the ‘burdens’ of regulation (Carter et al., 2009; Edwards et al., 2004). Our 
research analyses employment relationships within medium-sized enterprises to examine how the 
regulatory context might be interpreted, enacted, ignored and negotiated. These are firms that retain 
owner–manager centrality and a degree of informality but have formalised and, in theory, have more 
sophisticated policies and practices with which to engage with regulation than more informal small 
enterprises (Carter et al., 2009). The psychological contract provides a valuable way of conceptual-
ising the interplay of these informal and formal influences within the employment relationship, 
capturing important perceptions of rights and obligations that fall outside of the formal contract.
Medium-sized firms represent an interesting case, retaining a history of informal negotiation in 
the context of more formal systems that, in our firms, were established in part to ensure greater 
regulatory compliance and protection from employment tribunals. Within our research, examples 
manifested in the staff handbook at InsCo, health and safety at SteelCo and selection criteria for a 
redundancy exercise at TechCo. The owner–managers of all three firms relied, to varying degrees, 
on external consultants and expressed the security they felt this helped provide in managing the 
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employment relationship and protecting them from the perceived dangers of employment regula-
tion. However, the formal policies and practices that represented regulation within the firms not 
only operated in these relatively direct ways. We suggest that the dynamic, indirect effects of regu-
lation can be valuably understood through the ways in which the development and negotiation of 
perceived rights and obligations draw upon formal and informal elements of the organisation and 
the interplay between them.
Despite high degrees of formality, informal practices pervaded the firms and were often pre-
ferred to formal procedures. Through this preference for informality, even compliance with regula-
tions served less to remove management prerogative than to reposition its application. Examples 
of this arose in all three firms, despite their differences in employee status and education, financial 
performance and management style. For example, at TechCo, while some staff perceived formal 
selection criteria as lending the redundancy process some legitimacy, others argued that manage-
ment had, in complying with regulations, constructed the criteria in such a way as to target those 
staff they deemed problematic and, to a degree, this was supported by senior management accounts. 
The exercise of informal management prerogative in this example had moved from being exercised 
explicitly in selecting particular employees for redundancy, to application earlier in the redundancy 
process when formulating the criteria required, achieving management designs.
Where the relationship was held to be compliant with appropriate employment regulations, 
management interpreted this as fulfilling the sum of their obligations with respect to staff. At 
SteelCo, this related even to extreme incidences of health and safety as well as in providing protec-
tion and guidance for the owner–manager’s brash management style. At InsCo, more harmonious, 
informal employment relations were apparent, with the owner–manager suggesting that employ-
ment regulations were largely irrelevant and ‘30 years behind good business practice’. However, 
formal documentation still contained only those rights and obligations relating to minimal compli-
ance, operating on a similar principle to that at SteelCo.
The coexistence of informality and formality within medium-sized firms (Marlow, 2003; 
Marlow et al., 2010) can be seen in these examples through their informing the perceptions of 
rights and obligations that draw upon the interplay between informal negotiation and formally 
recorded policies. Managers interpreted any provisions that went beyond what they understood to 
be minimal obligations, such as with paid periods of absence at InsCo, as bonuses granted (or with-
held) at their discretion. Thus, formal documentation was used to negotiate employee compliance 
in such a way that there was relatively little fear of breach of the psychological contract. Owner–
managers did not feel that these individual bonuses constituted improved rights or created obliga-
tions beyond each specific application. Rather, they broadly felt bound only by what was formally 
set out and that for which they could be clearly and explicitly held accountable, not through direct 
reference to regulation.
The repositioning of owner–manager prerogative was compounded since, where formality 
represented external regulation, this was taken by employees as an unproblematic translation 
Thus, employees, focused on their perceptions of a psychological contract, effectively ignored 
the regulation itself, their (mis)understanding mediated by their interaction with the formally 
produced documents. Employers were not held accountable to the regulation but to its mediated 
form within the organisation. This led to dynamic, indirect and unpredictable effects, such as an 
informal bonus system for time-off at InsCo, new forms of ‘by the book’ discipline at SteelCo or 
the revised basis of redundancies at TechCo. Many of these effects were accepted by a majority 
of employees across all three firms, irrespective of level of education, pay or status. As a result, 
employment regulation was not guaranteed to have its desired impacts and owner–managers 
were rarely burdened beyond the expense of their legal advisors, their informal prerogative 
largely still governing these firms.
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Despite an owner–manager expressing concern that, once a practice was formally recorded in 
the staff handbook, management could find their discretion constrained, the impact of formal poli-
cies in constraining management prerogative can be overstated. In each of the firms, it was man-
agement, advised by their specialists, who decided what went into the formal documents. This 
more informal owner–manager prerogative grants them some discretion over what rights are high-
lighted to employees and, where possible, allows owner–managers to shape policies that, while 
ensuring minimal regulatory compliance, maintain their discretion and suit their personal prefer-
ences. Furthermore, once a policy is formalised, owner–manager prerogative becomes reified and 
separated from its source, forming part of the rules on which the company operates and influencing 
the perceived psychological contract. As such, employees found it hard to negotiate around formal 
policy because it is the preserve of management, including the discretion to effect alterations, as 
suggested at InsCo.
The interplay between informality and formality provides a form of negotiation which alters the 
ways in which regulation dynamically and indirectly influences the employment relationship with 
effects and outcomes that are difficult to foresee. This can be theoretically understood in terms of 
the development and negotiation of perceptions of the psychological contract in terms of perceived 
rights and obligations. For both employers and employees, this draws upon both informal and for-
mal sources and is negotiated on an ongoing, everyday basis. Regulation does not necessarily 
remove informality, owner–manager prerogative or the role of perceived rights and obligations, 
although it does influence them and how they are exercised.
Conclusion
Set within the context of a dominant political narrative of enterprise and business growth, employ-
ment regulation is often presented as a particular problem for SMEs. However, despite this popular 
perception of ‘the effect’ of regulation, research has begun to indicate a more complex scenario, 
with regulation having dynamic, indirect effects on firms (Edwards et al., 2004; Kitching et al., 
2013a). This article has explored these issues with reference to employment relationships in 
medium-sized firms. It suggests that some of these dynamic, indirect effects can be understood in 
terms of the psychological contract which helps to conceptualise the interplay of the formal and 
informal elements of the employment relationship as regards the development and negotiation of 
perceived rights and obligations.
Our findings contribute to a growing understanding of regulation in medium-sized firms. 
Through a focus on employment regulation, we have identified a range of both formal and 
informal processes that, through their interplay, altered the dynamic, indirect effects of regu-
lation within the firms. Formal policy documents and procedures were not predominantly 
seen by owner–managers as representing (best) practices within their firms, potentially limit-
ing the reliability of studies gathering information only in terms of these policies. Where 
these formal documents were influential was in shaping the psychological contract, albeit 
through informal processes of second-hand reports, management interactions and personal 
experiences, reflecting the firms as informal, storytelling organisations as much as policy-
led, formal operations. In each firm, the ways in which regulation was interpreted, enacted, 
ignored and negotiated therefore produced a variety of unpredictable interactions between 
the formal policies and the informality associated with owner–manager prerogative and 
employee negotiation.
This conceptually develops the psychological contract in the specific context of medium-sized 
firms, which allows us to better understand dynamic, indirect effects of regulation. Employees 
lacked the ability to enter full negotiations of rights and obligations around the repositioned areas 
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of informality and owner–manager decision making. This was explained by a lack of knowledge 
and a tendency to regard formal policies and procedures as representing external regulations 
unproblematically. What they perceived as their rights and obligations, and where they perceived 
forms of breach or failure on the part of employers, can be usefully conceptualised in relation to a 
psychological contract that embraces the formal and informal, direct and indirect influences of 
regulation within the employment relationship.
There are several limitations with this type of qualitative exploratory study. While studying 
firms from different sectors allowed us to broaden the scope of our research, for example, in terms 
of employee education and status, it also limited the degree of between-firm comparison. 
Employees in the participating firms, especially those of lower status and education level, may 
not articulate their full understanding or might be alienated by engaging in terms of a psychologi-
cal contract (Dick and Nadin, 2011). Furthermore, having conducted in-depth research in only 
three firms, the results are not broadly generalisable, providing instead interpretive insights and 
avenues for further research. Future research should seek to further develop our understanding of 
how the interplay between informality and formality influences the psychological contract and, 
beyond this, to seek further generalisation of the dynamic, indirect effects that regulation can 
produce within SMEs.
For policy-makers, it seems clear that rights and obligations need to be communicated more 
clearly and directly to employees. However, this alone may not help redefine perceived psycho-
logical contracts that had few reference points outside of the firm beyond the owner–manager’s 
legal advisors and dominant neo-liberal and managerialist discourses. This suggests some of the 
complexities and nuances in the role of the psychological contract.
This article has critically analysed, using empirical illustrations, how the interplay between 
informality and formality informs an ongoing negotiation within the employment relationship 
that alters the dynamic, indirect effects of regulation. We suggest that, theoretically, this can 
be understood through the development and negotiation of perceptions of the psychological 
contract which, for both employers and employees, draws upon informal and formal sources 
and is negotiated on an ongoing, everyday basis. These insights suggest why, in practice, the 
claimed burdens on employers of regulation may be exaggerated and, moreover, that regula-
tion must speak to the psychological, as well as the formal written contract if it is to be 
effective.
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